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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

ILLINOIS POWDER MANU·F ACTURING COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff,
-vs.STATE TAX COMMISSION OF
THE STATE OF UTAH and R.
E. HAMMOND, J. WELTON
WARD and ELISHA WARNER,
as the duly appointed and acting
commissioners thereof,
Defendant.

Case No.

7415

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT

F IJANLGE D
2

1950

HAL TAYLOR
Attorney for Defendant
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Argument:
Point 1. Does the taxpayer's procedure in
filing Tax Cormnission form No. 71 constitute
the filing of a use tax return?
••••••
Point 2. Is the method used by the corrunission
in ~aking this assess~ent so unconscionable as
to be a nu1li ty? • • . • • • • • • • • • • • •
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In the SupreDie Court
of the State of Utah
ILLINOIS POWDER MANUF ACTURING COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff,

-vs.STATE TAX CO:MMISSION OF
THE STATE OF UTAH and R.
E. HAMMOND, J. WELTON
vV ARD and ELISHA WARNER,
as the duly appointed and acting
commissioners thereof,
Defendant.

Case No.

7415

G. HAL TAYLOR
Attorney for Defendant
~·· .

BRIEF OF DEF'ENDANT

FACTS
The defendant's statement of the case contains the
essential facts upon which a determination may be had.
Except for the allegations made as to the arbitrarines~
of the Commission's assessment, which is now being·
raised for the first time on appeal, the defendant acSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
quiesces in such statement of facts for the purpose of
this brief.
One further fact which it is felt should be noted at
this time is the fact that the instant controversy was
presented to the Commission on a claim for refund
which set forth the reason for the claim as follows:
''The amount claimed for refund was assessed
by the commission against the taxpayer for the
years 1940, 1941, 1942 and 1943, and such assessment for the years enumerated was barred by
applicable statutes of limitation." (Tr. 22)
QUESTIONS INVOLVED
Plaintiff's Assignments of Error raise two questiom\
for determination. The first question presented is, we
submit, the only question to be decided on this appeal.
That question stated by plaintiff is as follows:
"(1) Does the taxpayer's procedure in filing
the Tax Commission's Form 71 constitute the
filing of a use tax return~''
The second question raised by tax,payer 's Assigilment of Error, No. 4, i.e., that the rrax Commissiou
erred in failing to find that the assessment was arhitrar~'
and capricious and without basis in law and fad, or,
as stated in plaintiff's brief as point No. 2, "b the
method used by the commission in making this assesHment so unconscionable as to be a nullity f '' will not he
discussed by the defendant, except to point out to the
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court that this question is being presented for the first
time on appeal and \Yas not considered by the cornmission.

ARGUMENT
Point 1.
Does the taxpayer's procedure in filing Tax Commission Form No. 71 constitute the filing of a use tax return?

Plaintiff's argument with regard to the question of
the statute of limitations sets forth no authority in support of the argurnent that the claim asserted by the Tax
Commission is barred by the statute of limitations. A
perusal of plaintiff's argument indicates that nothing
more is done than to point out to the court the apparent
unfairness of the assessment, and makes an attempt to
distinguish the case of Whitmore Oxygen Company vs.
State Tax Commission, 196 Pac. 2d 976.
\Ve have no argument with plaintiff's dissertation
with regard to the purpose of a statute of lin1itations.
Such a statute is a statute of repose and is for the purpose of compelling the exercise of the right of action
\Yithin a reasonable tin1e, but it appears that to argu~
the purpose of the statute of limitations in this case
merely begs the question properly presrnted as to when,
under the circumstances of this case, the statute of limitations began to run.
\Y e will submit that the taxpayer in this case failed
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to furnish any information with respect to required
items as set forth in the instructions furnished the taxpayer and, therefore, a return has not been filed within
the meaning and intent of our Use Tax Act.
Item No. 7, relating to purchases of tangible ~er
sonal property purchased by the taxpayer for storage,
use or consumption in this state, on all of the returns
available, both duplicate and original during the period
of the audit, is totally blank. (Tr. G4-105, Tr. 118-141)
True, in several instances, as pointed out by the plaintiff in its brief, there are spaces which contain certain
markings and also in some instances the word ''none.''
We would submit that an examination of all the returns
available during the period of the audit iiHlicates that
the taxpayer made no genuine endeavor to satisfy the
requirements of the Tax Commission's instructions. Instructions issued with regard to Item No. 7 read a:-;
follows:
"Item 7. Enter as this item, valued at the
sales 'Price, all purchases made by you onts:clP ot'
Utah or in interstate commerce for storage, u~(·
or consumption by you in this State upon which
the seller has not collected the use tax. For the
most part, this item will include equipment, supplies, merchandise, etc., purchased from out-ofstate sellers. It should not include (a) merchandise purchased for resale; or (b) materials which
become an ingredient or component part of tangible personal property to be sold.''
Nor is there any attempt made to comply with the
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instructions set forth on Form TC 71 under Item 7
which reads as follows:
"Purchases-Total purchase price of tangible
personal property purchased for storage, use, or
other consumption in this state on which the
seller has not collected sales or use tax (See 'Instructions'). ''
In Flors]zeim Bros. Dry Goods Compauy Y. United
States (1930) 280 U. S. 453, 460, ~lr. Justice Brandeis
speaking for a unanimous court stated:
''The burden of supplying by the return the
information on which assessments were to be
based was thus imposed on the taxpayers. And,
in providing that the period of limitation should
begin on the date the return was filed, rather
than when it was due, the statute plainly manifested a purpose that the period was to commence
only when the taxpayer had supplied this information in the prescribed manner.''
\Ve submit that, in view of the fact that Item 7 is
blank on all return~ available, taxpayer did not supply
information in the prescribed manner.
In Corona Coal & Coke Company vs. Commissioner
(1928) 11 B. T .A. 240, taxpayer filed a form 1120, which
was duly signed by the proper officers of the company.
This form ·was blank "'ith the exception of one line
which required information as to the "net income for
taxable year.'' At the blank space provided for the
amount of net income there appeared the word ''none."
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No other blank spaces were filled in and no other information was contained in the return except the name and
address of the taxpayer. The Board of Tax Appeals in
that case held in substance that the word "none" written on the document was not sufficient to start the running of the statute of limitations where other information is required. See also The Jockey Club (1934) 30
B;T.A. 670, aff'd. without discussion of this point.
( C.C.A. 2d 1935). 76 F. 2d 597 (blank return accompanied by letter claiming exempt status).
We submit that the burden of furnishing the information upon which an assessment may be made is cast
by law upon the taxpayer. By measuring the period of
limitation from the filing of the return, the statute maH.lfests a clear legislative intent that:
'' * * * the ~period should begin only when the
taxpayer had furnished such information in the
manner prescribed. Florsheim Bros. Co. Y. United
States, 380 U. S. 453 * * *. ~ieticulous accuracy,
perfect completeness, or absence of any omission
is not exacted. But a return which fails to comply
in a substantial degree with the requirements of
the statute in respect to disclosing the requisite
information essential to the making of assessments does not suffice to start the period of limitation." Alkire Inv. Co. v. Nicholas (C.C.A., lOth
Cir.), 114 Fed. (2d) 607, 710.

In denying· the taxpayer's clai1n that collection ot
the tax was barred by the statute of limitations, the Cir-
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cuit Court in the last cited case stated In addition to
above quoted matter as follo,vs:

"• * * While there was no intentional fraud,
willful negligence or purposed attempt at evasion
of tax on the part of the taxpayer, the returns
not only failed to disclose requisite information
but were misleading and calculated to prevent
discovery of material facts. Returns of that kind
are not effective to start the period of limitation
running. Compare Florsheim Bros. Co. v. United
States, supra; Lucas v. Pilliod Lumber Co., 281
U. S. 245 '" * *; Germantown Trust Co. v. Commissioner; 309 U. S. 304 * * *; United States v.
National Tank & Export Co., 5 Cir. 45 F. 2d 1005,
certiorari denied 283 U. S. 839, ,,, * * Myles Salt
Co. v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 49 F. 2d 232; National Contracting Co. v. Commissioner, 8 Cir.,
105 F. 2d 488."
So, too, in the instant case, there is no question of
fraud or willful negligence or any purpose to evade the
tax, but we submit that the returns are not of the kind
effective to start the period of the statute of limitations.
The contention i~ made by the plaintiff, as was done
in the Whitmore ( >x~'gPil Case, that the fact that Form
TC 71 was filed regularly and has been sworn to by tlh~
taxpayer as a true and contplete rd urn for sales and
use tax should ha yt-' :-\OlllP effect. This ('OUrt in the vVhi tmore Ox~·gpn ( ompany <'ast> held with regard to thi.-;
point that, •' If no marks, words or figun·s \\'PrP placed
on the form at all, that the taxpayer merely signed tlw
1
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printed certification, the form so filed would not constitute a return for either sales tax or use tax.''
As heretofore stated, the plaintiff attempts to distinguish the Whitmore Oxygen Case, supra. The differences noted, we submit, do not go to the fundamental
question involved herein; i.e., whether the forms as fileu
with the Tax Commission, conceding that the duplicates
represent the actual form of the original, constitute a
use tax return sufficient to start the statute of limitations running. The audit report reveals that the additional use tax liability results from the failure of taxpayer to report and remit use tax on purchases subject
to use tax (Tr. 26), and that portion of the rrturn;;
herein available relating to purchases made by tlH· taxpayer is blank in every instance.
The case of Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Hehering
( 1934) 293 U. S. 173, establishes the rule that perf('Ct
accuracy or completeness is not necessan· to resC'ne a
return from nullity. It is to be noted, hm,·p,·pr, that in
that case and similar cases, "·bile the return iileu may
not have been accurate or complete, it did contain entries of the kind required to be included in the return~
by federal law. Plaintiff herein filed returns upon which
the entries, in most cases, were addressed to but one of
the two tax liabilities and in no instance did it comply
with the requirement of the Commission's instruction~
on Form TC 71 that required 'Plaintiff to set forth its
purchases made for use in Utah or at least claim thaL
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none had been so made. Speculation as to how or why
the returns were filed as they were would be useless, but
it is subnlitted that an examination of the returns which
plaintiff claims started the statute of limitations to
running will reveal that they are not complete, and
surely do not furnish the required information.
The defendant relies on the Whitmore Oxygen Case,
supra, as being directly in point and submits that the
finding of the Comlltission, that no use tax return was
filed during the period of the audit, is correct and should
be sustained and that no error was committed by the Tax
Commission in failing to find that the deficiency use tax
assessment "Ta~ harre<l by any statute of limitation.
It is felt that some discussion should be had with
regard to the tax liability asserted by the Commission
with regard to the year 1940. It is admitted that the
originals and duplicates of the returns for the year 1940
have been destroyed in due course of businP~~ h~· the
taxpayer and thP Com1nission and cannot now be produced. Plaintiff's eounsel objected to the introductio11
of certain original and dupli<'ate returns of the taxpayer
for the ~·ears 1944 to 1949, inclusiYP, and <'ih·~ in support of its contention that presumptions are lH'Y<'r retroadi\·<·. the general rulP cited in Vol. 20, ~\Itwriean Juri:-:..
208. Such, we admit, is the general rule. JT(l\n•ver, this
court in the ease of Uihso11 ,·:-;. EqlfitalJ!e Life Assurnnr:e
Sociel,tJ (1934), S-! Utah 432, 36 Pae. 2d 103 at p. 111,
had the following to say concerning this 'principlt>:
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"While it may be conceded that there is 'no
'presumption from the fact that a condition exists
at a particular time that it existed in the past,' it
is also true that 'proof of present condition of a
thing may sometimes be admissible and material
as circumstantial evidence, persuasive as to prior
condition or status.' Jones Comm. on Evid., Vol.
1, pp. 440, 441; Encyl. of Evid., pp. 916, 917; 32
L.R.A. (N.S.) at page 1117, note."
See also 31 C.J.S., Sec. 140 at page 789, where the
following appears:
''As a general rule mere proof of the existence of a present condition or state of facts or
proof of the existence of a condition or state of
facts at a given time, does not raise any presumption that the same condition or facts existed
at a prior date, since inferences or presumptions
of fact ordinarily do not run backward.
''However, the general rule is not of universal
application. Whether the past existence of a condition or state of facts may be inferred or presumed from proof of the existence of a present
condition or state of facts, or proof of the t•xi~t
ence of a condition or state of facts at a given
time, depends largely on the facts and circumstances of the individual case, and on the likelihood of intervening circumstances as the true
origin of the present existence or the existence
at a given time. Accordingly, in some circumstances, an inference as to the past existence of
a condition or state of facts may be proper, as,
for example, where the present condition or
state of facts is one that would not ordinarily
exist unless it had also existed at the time as
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to which the presumption is invoked. An inference that a state of affairs existed at a certain
time may be reinforced by evidence that it con~
tinued to exist at a subsequent time.''

'N e submit, therefore, that ·in view of this exception to the general rule, that the Commission could and
this court can now consider the course of action taken
by the tax;payer in this case in filing Tax Commission
Form 71 with the Tax Commission over this period of
ye:trs, including the years after the audit.
It will be noted that not until after the period of
the audit did the taxpayer make any conscientious, genuine endeavor to compute and pay any use tax to the
state of Utah. All during the years of the period of the
audit for which we have either duplicates or originals of
Form TC 71, the taxpayer exercised no conscious endeavor to compute or pay use tax on purchases of tangible personal 1property made for use in Utah. In one
instance, the :March-April return of 1942, the taxpayer
computed an amount of $7.44 which purported to be use
tax on a purchase made in California. (Tr. 92) This is
the only case during the period of the audit for which
returns are available in wh:ch the plaintiff computed or
paid any use tax on a regular return. The only other
instance where plaintiff paid any use tax \Vas on a single
return filed on the 8th day of January, 1944, paying the
use tax on an International-6 truck. This return was
made out locally and not h~· the plaintiff's general office~
at St. Louis, :Missouri, as were all of the other returns.
(Tr. 140)
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Surely it is a fair presumption that the 'Plaintiff
never had any intention to pay any use tax to the state
of Utah, at least during the period of the audit. The
schedules set forth in the audit report (Tr. 28-51) indicate the number of items purchased and credited to
the Utah account. The Commission, after discussions
with the taxpayer's representative, concluded that under
the facts of this case there was no negligence and the
negligence penalty was never assessed against the taxpayer. It is submitted that the only conclusion that can
be reached from the facts as presented to this court i::;
that the taxpayer had no knowledge of the requirement
of the Tax Commission with regard to the filing of use
tax returns and, consequently, the conclu~ion is ine~eap
able that no use tax returns were filed during the period
of the audit.
While, as heretofore pointed out, there are no returns, either duplicates or originals, available for tlw
year 1940, it will be noted that it was not until the September-October return of 1941 that the dupl:cates ind:cate any mark of any kind with regard to tltt-' use tax
and it is submitted that inasmuch as four returns wPre
filed during the first eight months of the year 1941 ('fr.
99-106) without a mark of any kind with regard to u~c~
tax, the fact may be considered by the court as material
with regard to the filing of returns during the year 1940,
and we submit that it is fair to assume that the returns
filed during 1940 were filed in the Saine manner as were
the returns immediately subsequent to that year.
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Point 2.
Is the method used by the commission in making this
assessment so unconscionable as to be a nullity?
~-\s

heretofore indicated it is the position of the
defendant herein that the plaintiff is presenting this
question for the first time on appeal and consequently
it is fundamental that such argument will not be considered by the court.
Under date of December 17, 1947 the plaintiff herein
submitted a letter to the Tax Commission (Tr. 3-1-) and
attached thereto a petition for review of audit division's
findings and for hearing. (Tr. 55) In this petition tl1P
plaintiff set forth as grounds for a review and hearing
the following :

"1. The findings indicate a tax liability
which is excessive.
'' 2. The findings would 1purport to authorize
a tax for transactions arising prior to December
11, 1944, and would thus purport to authorize an
assessment or leYy barred by the Statute of Limitations, State of Utah (Laws 1937, Chapter 138,
Section 1) '':hich provides that every action for
a liability created by the Statutes of the State of
Utah shall be commenced within three years. The
liability by reason of the findings herein mentioned could not, under the law, therefore, exceed
the sum of $912.78, being the total tax computed
for 1944 to 1947, inclusive.
'' 3.

There was no negligence or intentional
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disregard of authorized rules, and the findings
are therefore erroneous in assessing a penalty of
10% and interest at 12% per annum.
'' 4.
eous.''

~~

;II

The findings are in other respects, erron-

Unfortunately all of the corespondence had in this
matter does not appear in the record. Under date of
April 26, 1948 the plaintiff communicated with th~
Commission and stated as follmYs:

;m

1.'01

::1

"The Statute of Limitations being the main
exception we are taking to your audit deficiency
report, and it is my desire if possible to .avoid a
trip to Utah for the hearing and the time-consuming operation of checking back through old
records to ascertain whether or not the items
contained in your audit report were taxable, we
will be willing to settle this deficiency without a
hearing, if you will waive the penalty of 10%
and interest at 12% per annum which is claimed
by you for negligence or intentional disregard for
authorized rules.
"I will welcome your comments should your
Commission be willing to settle on the above
basis with the understanding that w·e could expect a refund if the decision in the case of \Yhitmore Oxygen Company is in favor of the taxpayer.''
Upon receipt of this letter the Commission considered the matter and the taxpayer was advised that tlw
penalty and a portion of the interest had been cancellerl.
('rr. 52) The Commission had determined that there
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was no negligence and thus the penalty originally assessed could be deleted. (Tr. 9)
The plaintiff was further advised that the total
amount then due was $5,249.97. (Tr. 52) This amount
was paid to the Commission with the understanding that
the matter would be heard on a claim for refund and was
held up pending the outcome of the Whitmore Oxygen
Company case, in which a similar question was being
determined by the Supreme Court (Tr. 9).
It should be noted that the settlement thus made
was made with the understanding that the taxpayer
could expect a refund if the decision in the 'Yhitmore
Oxygen Company case ·was in favor of the taxpayer, and
there was no other proviso.
The attention of the court is also called to the preliminary statements and the stipulations of counsel.
(Tr. 8-12) It is submitted that nowhere in these stah··ments or stipulations as to the basis of the hearing did
the taxpayer, 1)~' and through its counsel, assert that tlw
Tax Commission was being arbitrary or unconscionable.
It being a fundamental principle of law that matters
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, it is suhmitted that the asserted arbitrary action hy the Commission should not be considered h~, the court. Even assuming that the court can consider the question of arbitrariness on the part of the Commiss~on, and eonsider point
two, it is submitted that the record does not sustain
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plaintiff's position that the Commission acted arbitrarily.
The payment in this case, as heretofore pointed out, was
made because the taxpayer had no desire to ''check back
through old records,'' ( Tr. 53) and thus comply with
the reasonable request of the examining officer set forth
in the summary of the audit report (Tr. 26) as follows:
''The examining officer would appreciate it
if the invoices and contracts of his listed in the
report would be forwarded to taxpayer's Salt
L:ake Office, where he could examine them.''
Can the plaintiff now seriously contend, havin~
agreed to the settlement of the tax provided the tax would
be refunded in the event of a favorable decision in the
Whitmore Oxygen Company case, that the Commission's
assessment was so arbitrary as to be a nullity~ wr e
think not.
It is respectfully submitted, in view of the fact that
the question as to the unconscionableness of the asse~,.;
ment is being raised for the first time on appeal, and
particularly in view of the fact that there is no substantial evidence in the record that the Commission did ad
arbitrarily, that the court should not consider point No.2.
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion the defendant, State Tax Commission!
respectfully submits that, in view of the arguments here-
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in presented and the authorities cited, this rourt should
deny petitioner's l'laim~.
WHEREFORE, defendanb pray that the <lPeii"iion
heretofore rendered by the Tax Commission in this
matter be affirmed and judgment rendered accordingly.
Respectfull~r

submitted,

G. Hal Taylor,
Attorney for Defendant~
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